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ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVES ON SALT
A New Theory of Equitable Apportionment
by David Gamage and Darien Shanske
There is a lot of ferment surrounding equitable 
apportionment under section 18 of the Uniform 
Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act.1 The 
Multistate Tax Commission has made revisions to 
section 18 and is considering more,2 and there are 
many recent controversial equitable apportionment 
cases — most notably Vodafone in Tennessee.3 Issues 
in controversy include who bears the burden of 
proof, what that burden is, and how and whether to 
deal with specific industries and issues.4
At least in theory, equitable apportionment 
provides state tax authorities with a crucial tool for 
combatting taxpayers’ attempts to game multistate 
apportionment formulas.5 According to Lee 
A. Sheppard of Tax Analysts: “Section 18 was
intended to be a broad grant of authority to state tax 
administrators to change the apportionment
method for a taxpayer whose method did not fairly
reflect in-state activity. It is meant to be applied
sparingly. But there is a fear that the single-sales-
factor rules adopted by many states are causing
more alternative adjustments.”6
Here, we address a single but broad question: 
What is the purpose of equitable apportionment 
in the age of the single sales factor? Contrary to 
what has been suggested by some other leading 
state tax experts, we argue that equitable 
apportionment remains coherent and useful even 
within the context of single-sales-factor 
apportionment regimes.
But first, let us consider contrary views. 
Notably, SALT luminary Richard Pomp of the 
University of Connecticut Law School, author of 
the MTC hearing officer’s report that contained 
many of the sensible proposals to reform section 
18, stated in that report that “from a tax policy 
perspective, the single sales factor is virtually 
indefensible.”7
David Gamage is a professor of law at 
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, and 
Darien Shanske is a professor at the University 
of California, Davis, School of Law (King Hall).
In this edition of Academic Perspectives on 
SALT, the authors discuss the purpose of 
equitable apportionment, arguing that it 
remains coherent in the context of single-sales-
factor apportionment regimes.
1
See, e.g., Roxanne Bland, “UDITPA Section 18 and Alternative 
Apportionment Formulas,” State Tax Notes, May 15, 2017, p. 675; 
and Christopher T. Lutz et al., “Trends and Developments in 
Alternative Apportionment of State Income,” State Tax Notes, May 
8, 2017, p. 559.
2
Amy Hamilton, “MTC Restarts Work on Alternative 
Apportionment Model Regulations,” State Tax Notes, Sept. 12, 2016, 
p. 850.
3
Vodafone v. Roberts, 486 S.W.3d 496 (Tenn. 2016). For critical 
discussion see Lutz et al., supra note 1; and Peter L. Faber, 
“Inequitable Apportionment: A Bad Precedent in Tennessee,” State 
Tax Notes, Apr. 25, 2016, p. 277.
4
See, e.g., Lutz et al., supra note 1.
5
It is also a tool for taxpayers to counter unreasonable results. 
Though that aspect of equitable apportionment is not the focus of 
this article, we do not mean to suggest that it is less important. We 
hope to return to considering equitable apportionment from the 
taxpayer’s perspective in a future article.
6
Sheppard, “News Analysis: Shoring Up UDITPA Section 18,” 
State Tax Notes, Aug. 4, 2014, p. 310.
7
Report of the Hearing Officer [Richard Pomp] Multistate Tax 
Compact Article IV [UDITPA], at 14 (Oct. 25, 2013).
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To a substantial degree, we consider Pomp’s 
argument to be both empirically and theoretically 
compelling. As an empirical matter, it is certainly 
the case that states did not shift to single sales 
factor to more accurately locate multistate 
businesses’ income. Rather, states have adopted 
single sales factor because of the belief that this 
would make their home industries more 
competitive.8
Moreover, as a matter of theory, it is hard to 
understand how single sales factor could be an 
improvement on ascertaining where income is 
produced. It would be one thing to quibble with 
how much a company’s payroll contributes to its 
income relative to its sales, but it is quite another 
to give payroll no weight at all. How could it 
make sense for a state that housed all of a 
corporation’s payroll to have no income 
apportioned to that state simply because all of the 
corporation’s sales are in other states? So, if Pomp 
is correct in arguing that formulary 
apportionment using the single sales factor is 
indefensible on policy grounds, what is there for 
equitable apportionment to correct if a state has 
adopted single sales factor?
Accordingly, as reported by Tax Analysts’ 
Amy Hamilton, “former MTC Chair Bruce 
Johnson, now with Taxometry LLC, said section 
18 ‘really doesn’t work anymore’ because it 
speaks in terms of factors that fail to fairly reflect 
a company’s business activity in a state. In a state 
that has gone to single-sales-factor 
apportionment, he said, it would be easy to put an 
economist on the stand and say that a formula 
that completely disregards all of a company’s 
property and payroll does not fairly reflect the 
business activity in the state.”9 Rick Handel, 
another prominent commentator, then takes the 
next logical step and argues that states should be 
prepared to default back to the traditional three-
factor formula in some section 18 cases.10
Nevertheless, contrary to those views, we 
argue that single-sales-factor apportionment is 
not incoherent and that therefore, there is a proper 
use for equitable apportionment within single-
sales-factor apportionment regimes. To develop 
our argument, we need to step back and consider 
just what kind of tax the state corporate income 
tax (CIT) has become in the era of single-sales-
factor apportionment. Building on a seminal 
argument made by Charles McLure,11 one of us 
(Shanske) has argued elsewhere that there is an 
important way in which the double shift to single 
sales factor and market-based sourcing of sales, 
including services and intangibles, has changed 
the nature of the CIT.12 The simple version of that 
argument is as follows: The more a corporation — 
say Amazon.com — sells in a state, the more of its 
income will be taxable in that state. Say that the 
state is California and that the relevant CIT rate is 
10 percent. Then Amazon would be paying a 10 
percent tax on the net income from its sales into 
California.
To be sure, matters are not that simple. The 
analytic core of the argument (developed in more 
depth elsewhere13) is that, based on reasonable 
assumptions, corporations experience increased 
CIT liability at the margin as a product of 
increased sales, rather than as a product of 
increased profits.
Here is an example to illustrate the point. 
Imagine that Corporation Z has a 10 percent 
sales factor in California and earns a $20 
8
See, e.g., the ballot argument for California’s Proposition 39, 
which instituted mandatory single-sales-factor apportionment.
9
Hamilton, “MTC Alternative Apportionment Group 
Grappling With Sourcing Issues,” State Tax Notes, Mar. 7, 2016, p. 
705.
10
Handel, “Using UDITPA Section 18 in South Carolina and 
Beyond,” State Tax Notes, July 27, 2015, p. 349. Philip Morris 
recently petitioned California’s Franchise Tax Board for the use of a 
more traditional formula, arguing that the single sales factor did 
not fairly represent the sources from which the taxpayer derived its 
income. The petition was heard on June 15, 2017. The petition and 
the FTB response are available at https://www.ftb.ca.gov/law/
meetings/06152017/8.pdf. Our understanding is that the petition 
was rejected. The argument of this essay strongly suggests that this 
was the right result, at least in the abstract.
11
Charles E. McLure Jr., “The State Corporate Income Tax: 
Lambs in Wolves’ Clothing,” In the Economics of Taxation, edited by 
Henry J. Aaron and Michael J. Boskin (1980), at 327; and Shanske, 
“A New Theory of the State Corporate Income Tax: The State 
Corporate Income Tax as Retail Sales Tax Complement,” 66 Tax Law 
Review 305 (2013).
12
Shanske, supra note 11, at 321-22.
13
Id. at 344-48.
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million profit on $100 million of sales 
nationally. Assuming California has a 10 
percent CIT rate, then Corporation Z’s tax 
liability in California is $200,000. Now suppose 
that Corporation Z makes $1 million in new 
sales in California, on which it will earn 
$100,000 in net income (a return of 10 percent). 
What happens to Corporation Z’s CIT liability 
to California? It is now $218,911 (10.89 percent 
[higher sales factor] x $20.1 million [higher net 
income] x 10 percent). If not for the single sales 
factor, how much would Corporation Z owe 
California? Only $201,000 or (10 percent x 10 
percent x $20.1 million). And so almost 95 
percent of Corporation Z’s higher liability to 
California is attributed to its new sales in 
California and not to its higher profits. This 
makes sense because the full value of its new 
sales went into the sales factor relative to the 
net income from the sale. The final assumption 
here is that the corporation can and will pass 
this additional cost on to the consumer, as it 
would a sales tax.
It is also worth noting that in the age of 
Quill, a CIT with single-sales-factor 
apportionment reaches a good portion of sales 
that the retail sales tax does not, at least for 
states with a substantial economic presence 
test for the CIT. And there is another reason 
that the new CIT reaches more sales than retail 
sales taxes: Sales of services and intangibles 
count toward the sales factor, even though 
those sales are often not subject to state retail 
sales taxes.
To be sure, the CIT with single-sales-factor 
apportionment is — at best — a poorly 
designed consumption tax merged with a 
poorly designed business income tax. There is 
no good reason why a corporation with high 
profit margins (that is, high income) should in 
effect be pushing more tax onto its consumers 
relative to a low (that is, low income) 
corporation. And why should only 
consumption through corporations be taxed?
Those problems should not be minimized. 
Yet consider the typical state retail sales tax by 
comparison. The typical retail sales tax does 
not reach huge swathes of consumption — 
namely services and intangibles — and 
overtaxes some sectors because of pyramiding. 
Nevertheless, commentators do not say that 
those flaws mean that the retail sales tax is not 
a consumption tax. Rather, they say that retail 
sales taxes are poorly designed consumption 
taxes.14 We say that the same is true of CITs 
with single-sales-factor apportionment.
What are the implications? One, a CIT with 
a single sales factor is clearly not incoherent, 
but just another poorly designed state-level 
consumption tax. Second, there is nothing 
inherently problematic with an origin state 
having no income apportioned to it. This 
means that a corporation should not be able to 
object if, for instance, a large amount of its 
income is apportioned to a market state — 
much larger than what the three-factor 
formula would permit. Of course, most states 
are also origin states, so a single-sales-factor 
state should not be able to use equitable 
apportionment to undo a result that 
apportions much of a domestic corporation’s 
income to a market state.
That explains what equitable 
apportionment should not do in the age of 
single sales factor, but what should it do? For 
one, equitable apportionment should continue 
to do many things it has always done, such as 
permitting taxpayers or administrators to 
separate lines of business in some cases.15 
Further, equitable apportionment should be 
used in cases in which there is something 
anomalous going on as to the location of sales 
without consideration of the location of the 
other factors.
For example, consider the Colorado district 
court’s analysis in Target Brands Inc. v. 
14
Or, as a leading casebook puts it, the retail sales tax is 
structurally flawed. Walter Hellerstein et al., State and Local 
Taxation, at 655 (10th ed. 2014).
15
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board, 139 P.3d 1169 
(Cal. 2006) (permitting calculating receipts from treasury function 
differently from other business functions for purposes of the sales 
factor).
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Department of Revenue.16 Because the taxpayer, 
an intangible holding company, had no factors 
in Colorado, it owed no CIT, which was an 
anomalous result given the large royalties it 
earned from the use of its intellectual property 
in Colorado. The court permitted the state to 
invoke section 18.17 The state proposed an 
alternative apportionment method in which it 
would rely on the sales factor — and only the 
sales factor — of the parent corporation, 
Target. Of course, as the court noted, use of just 
the sales factor would not give any credit to the 
contributions that the holding company 
employees made to the production of income; 
thus, the court found the alternative 
unreasonable.18
From our perspective, the court’s holding on 
this issue was half right. For part of the period in 
question, Colorado used a traditional three-factor 
formula. As to that period, at least in the abstract, 
the court’s analysis seems correct. Yet for the last 
tax year under review, the state had moved to 
single sales factor. Once the state had already 
shifted to single sales factor, we do not think that 
evaluating its alternative formula based on 
whether every factor’s contribution was fairly 
assessed is relevant. The state had decided that 
only the location of sales matters, and that is what 
both the state and taxpayers should then have to 
live with. Thus, for the tax year when Colorado 
used single sales factor, we think — at least in 
theory19 — that Colorado’s proposed alternative 
was reasonable.
A new approach to equitable apportionment 
is just one result that follows from reconceiving 
the state corporate income tax as a flawed 
consumption tax.20 We plan to explore others in 
future articles. One particularly important 
question is: Given that most states now have at 
least21 two deeply flawed consumption taxes, 
what would it take for states to make 
incremental steps toward better taxing 
consumption overall?22 
16
Target Brands Inc. v. Department of Revenue, No. 2015CV33831 
(Denver Dist. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 2017).
17
Permitting the state to use equitable apportionment at all is 
controversial because the Colorado statute would seem to 
apportion all income from royalties to the origin state because the 
income was from the sale of intangible property. See Clark R. 
Calhoun and Matt P. Hedstrom, “Target Brands: Both the Best and 
Worst Alternative Apportionment Analysis Yet,” Bloomberg BNA, 
Apr. 19, 2017. We understand why that is a close issue, as it was in 
Vodafone, but in Target Brands, unlike Vodafone, we think there was 
another factor that weighed in the court’s decision. Target is 
(primarily) in the business of selling tangible personal property, 
and as such its sales are subject to the usual apportionment rules. 
Target Brands was a holding company for Target’s intellectual 
property. Those holding companies, as the court observed in 
passing, are a well-known tool for tax avoidance. See Target Brands 
at *80 (citing Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Holding Intellectual Property, 
39 Ga. L. Rev. 1155, 1157 (2005) (the IP holding company tax 
avoidance scheme “has been widely and quietly utilized in the last 
twenty years”)). We are not claiming that the use of a holding 
company had no legitimate business purpose, but we are observing 
that using equitable apportionment essentially to treat a taxpayer 
as in the business it is in appears as an easier case than a case like 
Vodafone. Vodafone is in the business of selling other than tangible 
property; and it did not alter its business structure to make it 
appear (in part) otherwise.
18
Target Brands at *83.
19
Target Brands is a complicated case with complicated facts. It 
could well be that the state’s alternative is not reasonable in this 
case given facts that we are not considering. Our concern is wholly 
with the theoretical question whether relying on only the sales 
factor is reasonable once the state has shifted to use of the single 
sales factor.
20
For those who want to dig deeper into equitable 
apportionment questions, see Shanske, “Equitable Apportionment 
and the State Corporate Income Tax: Past, Present and Possible 
Future,” forthcoming. Please contact author for working draft.
21
Gross receipts taxes might be viewed as a third form of 
deeply flawed consumption tax within the few states that levy 
gross receipts and similar taxes.
22
For some of our prior academic work on why it is in the 
national interest for state governments to better tax consumption 
through firm and vendor level taxes, see, e.g., Gamage and Shanske, 
“Tax Cannibalization and Fiscal Federalism in the United States,” 
111 Northwestern University Law Review 295, at 362-369 (2017) 
(arguing that the federal government should assist state 
governments in improving their vendor- and firm-level 
consumption taxes); and Gamage, “The Case for Taxing (All of) 
Labor Income, Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth,” 68 Tax 
Law Review 355 (2015) (arguing that the U.S. tax system should 
include a vendor- or firm-level consumption tax — like a value-
added tax).
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